if it protects in the case of a corpse, which is stringent, that is because it is divided into tents; (1) shall it therefore protect in the case of earthen vessels which are less stringent but which are not divided into tents? (2) Now this is well according to the Rabbis. (3) But what can be said on R. Eliezer's view? (4) — R. Eliezer argues a fortiori. (5) If so, here too we can argue a fortiori: if sacred animals profane sacred animals, how much more does hullin! (6) — Rather, Rab's reason is in accordance with R. Eleazar. (7) For R. Eleazar said: What is Rab's reason? And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord: (8) holy things profane holy things, but hullin does not profane holy things. (9) This proves that a Scriptural text comes and nullifies the argument a fortiori; then here too, let the text ‘its inside’ come and nullify the argument a fortiori? (10) — This text, ‘its inside’, is required in respect of foodstuffs pasted round with clay and placed within the air-space of an oven. You might think, since they cannot be defiled by contact, (11) they cannot be defiled through its air-space either. Hence [the deduction] informs us that It is not so. (12) And the Rabbis? — [They argue,] No text is necessary in respect of these [foodstuffs]. (13) R. Joseph b. Ammi pointed out a contradiction between change [of intention] in respect of sanctity and change [of intention] in respect of owners, (14) and answered it. Did then Rab say: If one slaughters a sin-offering [for one offence] as a sin-offering [for another offence], (15) it is fit; as a burnt-offering, it is unfit? This then proves that another kind destroys it, whereas its own kind does not destroy it. Yet surely Rab said: If a sin-offering is slaughtered on behalf of one who is liable to a sin-offering, (16) it is unfit; on behalf of one who is liable to a burntoffering, it is fit. This proves that a person of the same category as the offender destroys it, whereas one of a different category does not destroy it? And he answered: In the former case, the Divine Law states, And he shall kill it for a sin-offering, (17) and lo, a sin-offering has been slaughtered as a sin-offering. But in the latter case it is written, and the priest shall make atonement for him, (18) [which intimates,] ‘for him’, but not for his fellow, and ‘his fellow’ implies one like himself, who stands in need of atonement just as he does. (19) R. Habibi showed a contradiction between the law of change [of intention] in respect of owners and that of the inside of the inside, and then answered it. Did then Rab say: If a sin-offering is slaughtered on behalf of one who is liable to a sin-offering, it is unfit; on behalf of one who is liable to a burnt-offering, it is fit? This then proves that its own kind destroys it, whereas a different kind does not destroy it. Yet surely it was taught: ‘Its inside’, but not the inside of it inside, and even a non-earthen vessel protects it? (20) And he answered: ‘Its inside’ is written four times, ‘the inside [tok]’,’its inside [toko]; ‘the inside’ [tok], ‘its inside [toko]’; (21) one is required for its essential law; (22) another for a gezerah shawah; (23) a third [intimates] the inside of this, but not the inside of another; (24) and finally [to teach]: Its inside, but not the inside of its inside, and even a non-earthen vessel protects. (25)

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(1). ↑ A single partition across a room is sufficient to divide it into two rooms, and if a corpse is in one, eatables or utensils in the other are not contaminated. Hence it is right that even a defective receptacle should have the same effect.
(2). ↑ I.e., a partition placed in an earthen vessel (sc. an oven) does not divide it into separate compartments (here designated ‘tents’), as stated supra 3a: therefore a defective receptacle cannot do so either; so Tosaf. Rashi explains more simply: if it protects... into tents — i.e., it is quite usual to partition off a room into two, therefore a partition converts it into two separate tents. But it is not usual to partition an oven: hence the partition cannot affect its status. On this interpretation it appears that R. Eliezer holds that a partition does affect it, protecting the foodstuffs from contamination. In that case they differ not only in respect to a defective receptacle, but also in respect to the partitioning of an oven by a board or curtain.
(3). ↑ The view that the defective receptacle (or, a partition) does not protect agrees with Rab's statement that what is not of its own kind does not ‘destroy’ it.
(4). ↑ According to him a different kind too apparently ‘destroys’ it: is then Rab's ruling a matter of dispute between the Rabbis and R. Eliezer?
(5). ↑ Generally he agrees with Rab, but in this particular case he rules differently, because of his argument.
(6). ↑ When one kills a sin-offering as a burntoffering, he is still killing it as something sacred, and yet you say it is unfit. How much more should it be unfit when he kills it as hullin, which is not sacred at all!
(7). ↑ Not because a different kind does not ‘destroy’ it, but because a Scriptural text teaches this law. Sh. M. emends: R. Elai.
(8). ↑ Lev. XXII, 15.
(9). ↑ Tosaf. suggests that ‘the holy things’ is superfluous, being understood from the context, and is therefore employed for this deduction.
(10). ↑ From this text, ‘its inside,’ it is deduced supra a, but not ‘the inside of the inside’, which is explained as meaning the inside of a second vessel within the first. Now from this it is deduced a fortiori that a partition does not destroy the unity of an oven (v. supra a), for if it did, a text would surely not be necessary for teaching that another vessel within the first protects its contents.
(11). ↑ For a ‘creeping thing’ cannot touch them.
(12). ↑ The food is defiled. This is learnt from the deduction, its ‘inside’, but not ‘the inside of its ‘inside’, whence it follows that a partition does not protect; and it is in respect of a partition of this nature, viz., clay pasted round food, that this conclusion is drawn.
(13). ↑ For they are obviously ‘inside’ of the oven.
(14). ↑ I.e. between wrongful intention in respect of the sacrifice and that in respect of the owner thereof; e.g., he offered the sacrifice under the name of one who was not its owner.
(15). ↑ Its owner had incurred the liability on account of a particular offence, whereas in slaughtering it he (or the priest) intended it as a sin-offering for some other offence.
(16). ↑ But who is not the owner of this particular sacrifice.
(17). ↑ Lev. IV, 33.
(18). ↑ Ibid. 26, 31, 35.
(19). ↑ For otherwise he cannot be called ‘his fellow’ in this respect. Hence the exclusion of his fellow applies only to such a case.
(20). ↑ Cf. supra a p. 7. n. 1.
(21). ↑ V. Lev. XI, 33, where toko (lit, ‘its inside’) is repeated twice, though in each case tok (‘inside’) would suffice. Each tok (which could have been written) is interpreted; further, each addition, ‘toko’, is likewise interpreted, which gives four in all.
(22). ↑ Viz., that any food or drink within it is defiled through the reptile (sherez) entering its air-space.
(23). ↑ V. Glos. Teaching that the dead reptile defiles the utensil too, through entering its air-space, even without touching it; v. Hul. 24b.
(24). ↑ Only an earthen vessel thus becomes unclean through its air-space without actual contact, but not a non-earthen vessel.
(25). ↑ Hence this is a specially decreed law and stands by itself; therefore its principle cannot be applied to sacrifices.