And it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage, the first tanna in the baraita cited by Rami bar Yeḥezkel, holds: There is forewarning for pebbles, and one Sage, Rav Yosef, holds: There is no forewarning for pebbles.

The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, perhaps the reference in the baraita is to a case where the rooster or animal damaged the vessel one time. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis, concerning compensation for damage caused by pebbles. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it atypical behavior for an animal to insert its head into a glass vessel, and isn’t all atypical behavior classified within the category of Goring, meaning that the owner should be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage? The Gemara answers: The case is one where there were seeds in the vessel, and therefore the rooster extending its head into the vessel is considered typical behavior.

Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: Is there any halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to propelling pebbles, and therefore if an animal propelled pebbles in an atypical manner its owner is liable to pay one-quarter of the damage, i.e., half the restitution for damage caused by pebbles? Or, is there no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to propelling pebbles, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage, and therefore, even in an atypical case, the owner pays the standard restitution of half the cost of the damage?

The Gemara answers: Resolve Rav Ashi’s dilemma from Rava’s dilemma, as Rava raises a dilemma: Is there forewarning for pebbles, or is there no forewarning for pebbles? Based on that dilemma, one may conclude by inference that there is no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to pebbles propelled by an animal, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage, as, were that the case, forewarning would lead to an animal owner’s liability to pay half the cost of the damage.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava stated his dilemma employing the style of: If you say. If you say that there is no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to propelling pebbles, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage, and the owner pays half the cost of the damage in every case, is there forewarning for pebbles, meaning that after three incidents the owner pays the full cost of the damage, or is there no forewarning for pebbles? According to that understanding, the halakha with regard to Rav Ashi’s dilemma cannot be inferred from Rava’s dilemma. Rav Ashi’s dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rav Ashi raises another dilemma with regard to pebbles: According to the opinion of Sumakhos, that one pays the full cost of the damage in the case of propelled pebbles, what is the halakha with regard to damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by the animal’s action? Is the status of that secondary force like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action, in which case the owner is liable, or is its status not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action?

The Gemara elaborates: Did Sumakhos learn the halakha that one pays half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles as a tradition transmitted to Moses at Sinai, and he interprets that tradition as applying in a case where the damage was caused by a force generated by a force generated by the action of an animal? By contrast, in a typical case of damage caused by pebbles, which is an example of a force generated by the action of an animal, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, as it is a subcategory of Trampling. Or perhaps he did not learn any halakha as a tradition in this regard at all, and therefore even in a case where the damage was caused by a force generated by a force generated by the action of an animal, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, as it is a subcategory of Trampling. The Gemara concludes: This dilemma, too, shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna teaches: If the animal was kicking while it was walking, or it occurred that pebbles were inadvertently propelled from under its feet and those pebbles broke vessels, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is the tanna of the mishna speaking?

The Gemara elaborates: Is the tanna saying that if the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick, which is a subcategory of Goring, or if the animal was walking and propelled pebbles in its typical manner, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage, and, accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one pays half the cost of damage caused by pebbles? Or perhaps the tanna is saying: If the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick, or if the animal propelled pebbles due to its kick and the pebbles caused damage, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. Accordingly, one may infer: But if the animal propelled pebbles as it was walking in its typical manner, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, and if so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the latter clause of the mishna: If an animal trod upon a vessel and broke it and then a shard of that vessel fell upon a second vessel and broke it, the owner pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the latter vessel. And if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, does he hold that one pays half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles?

And if you would say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, and can be understood as follows: The first vessel, concerning which the owner of the animal pays the full cost of the damage, is the first vessel damaged following the propelling of shards from the vessel upon which the animal trod, i.e., the second vessel that was broken. And the second vessel, concerning which the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage, is the second vessel following the propelling of shards from the vessel upon which the animal trod, i.e., the third vessel that was broken by shards from the second vessel. And the reason for the difference in liability is that there is a difference, according to Sumakhos, between damage caused by a force generated by the action of an animal, for which the owner pays the full cost of the damage, and damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by its action, for which he pays for only half the cost of the damage.

But if one were to say this explanation, what can be said of that dilemma which Rav Ashi raised: According to the opinion of Sumakhos, that one pays the full cost of the damage in the case of propelled pebbles, what is the halakha with regard to damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by the animal’s action? Is the status of that secondary force like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action, in which case the owner is liable, or is its status not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action? Why does he have a dilemma? Let him resolve from here that its status is not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action.

The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rav Ashi interprets the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that one pays half the cost of the damage in the case of propelled pebbles, and he raises this dilemma: If the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick, which is a subcategory of Goring, or if the animal was walking and propelled pebbles in its typical manner, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. Accordingly, one may infer: But if the pebbles were propelled due to a kick, the owner pays one-quarter of the damage. And there is halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to a case of pebbles, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage.

Or perhaps the tanna is saying: If the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick or if the animal propelled pebbles due to its kick and the pebbles caused damage, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. And there is no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to a case of pebbles. The Gemara concludes: Rav Ashi’s dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami, and some say that it was before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: If the animal was walking in a place where it is impossible for it to walk without propelling pebbles as it proceeds, and it kicked and propelled pebbles and caused damage, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Does one say that since it is impossible for it to walk without propelling pebbles, propelling pebbles is its typical manner in that situation and the halakha in this case would be the same as any case of pebbles? Or perhaps, since now, in any event, the pebbles were propelled due to a kick, it is different. The Gemara concludes: Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If the animal was walking in the public domain and it kicked and propelled pebbles and caused damage, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we liken the damage in this instance to Goring, since the action was performed with intent, and therefore the owner of the animal is liable even though the incident transpired in the public domain? Or perhaps, since this is a case of pebbles, it is classified as a subcategory of Trampling and the owner is exempt from liability in the public domain. Rabbi Zeira said to him: It stands to reason that it is a subcategory of Trampling.

Rabbi Yirmeya continued and asked Rabbi Zeira another question: If an animal propelled pebbles in the public domain and caused damage on private property, what is the halakha? Rabbi Zeira said to him, employing terminology from the halakhot of Shabbat: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Since the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain, the owner is exempt from liability for any damage that it causes. The fact that the damage occurred on private property is not relevant.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira’s first statement, that one is exempt from liability for one’s animal propelling pebbles in the public domain because it is classified as a subcategory of Trampling, from a baraita: If an animal was walking along the way and it propelled pebbles, whether it was on private property and whether it was in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay damages. What, is it not a case where the pebbles were propelled in the public domain and caused damage in the public domain? Rabbi Zeira replied: No, the reference is to a case where the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain and caused damage on private property. Rabbi Yirmeya asked him: But didn’t you say: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I retract my previous statement, as there is proof from the baraita that there is liability in that case.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira’s first statement from the mishna: If an animal trod upon a vessel and broke it and then a shard of that vessel fell upon a second vessel and broke it, the owner pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, as its action is classified under the primary category of Trampling, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the latter vessel. And it is taught in a baraita with regard to this halakha: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where the incident transpired on the private property of the injured party; but if it transpired in the public domain, the owner of the animal is exempt from liability for the first vessel, as it is classified as a subcategory of Trampling, and he is liable for the damage to the second vessel. What, is it not that the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain and it caused damage in the public domain, indicating that one does not pay for damage caused by pebbles in the public domain?

Rabbi Zeira replied: No, perhaps the reference in the mishna is to a case where the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain and it caused damage on private property. Rabbi Yirmeya said: But didn’t you say: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I retract my previous statement.

Rabbi Yirmeya raises an additional objection to Rabbi Zeira’s statement: Is that so? Is the owner of the animal exempt from liability for pebbles propelled by his animal in the public domain?